2014/12/16記
『リターン・トゥ・ケインズ』東大出版会
の内容についてのアブストラクト集
平井俊顕
2014年12月14日（日）の日本経済新聞に書評が掲載された。
日曜日の日経新聞に書評が掲載されているのを知る。こうした専門書の翻訳、しかも１人の著者による本ではなく、多様な見解が網羅されている本が書評の対象になるのは、珍しいように思う。日本の多くの人が、ケインズをめぐり、こうした多様な立論・研究が実際にはなされていることを知ってもらうきっかけとなれば、この書に原著の共同編者として、また翻訳の監訳者として携わった者として、これに優る喜びはない。
書評は全体的な所見が中心となっており、具体的に言及されていたのは２論文（トービン[5章]とウッドフォード[6章]に関連したもの）であった。これは新聞での書評であるから致し方のないところであろう。
ここではこの本で各論者がどのようなことを論じているのかを、当時、各論者に書いてもらったアブストラクトがあるので、それを以下に示しておくことにする。これらを読んで、本訳書であれ、原書であれ、興味をもっていただける契機となることを、私は望んでいる。
そのさい、全体を次のようにグルーピングできるので、それに合わせてアブストラクトを配置することにした。
― 章のジャンル別によるグルーピング ［全14章］
（以下、（ ）内の数字は章を示す。）
I. 現在国際経済情勢 ― アメリカ、EU、国際通貨体制との関連で論じられているもの (1、3、14)
II. 『一般理論』をどう理解するかをテーマにするもの (5、7、9、11)
III. 『一般理論』17章に焦点を合わせたもの － 肯定と否定
(1) 現代金融理論の先駆として肯定的に見る見解 (12、13)
(2) スラッファによる否定的評価 (10)
IV. 現在マクロ経済学をめぐるもの ― ケインズ理論に依拠しつつ
(1) マクロ理論の新旧潮流をめぐる比較分析 (4, 6) －比較理論史
(2) 理論モデルの提示 (2、8)
***
I. 現在国際経済情勢との関連で論じられているもの (1、3、14)
第1章 ケインズがアメリカに戻ってきた
Keynes Returns to America
Bradley W. Bateman (Denison University, Granville, Ohio, US)
When stagflation hit the American
economy in the 1970’s, it marked the beginning of the end for Keynesian
economics. During the thirty years of unprecedented economic growth following
the Second World War, a particularly American form of Keynesianism had come to
dominate the way that macroeconomic policy making was understood and
undertaken. While Keynesian ideas were not without enemies, especially in the
immediate postwar world, by the 1960s they served as the basic framework for
much of macroeconomic policy making. This Keynesian consensus depended on an
idea that there was a trade-off between inflation and unemployment; thus, when
both appeared together, there was a quick and concerted effort to make the
point that Keynesianism had been discredited. Several conservative ideas rushed
in to fill the void that was left by Keynesianism’s demise: monetarism,
supply-side economics, rational expectations theory, and neo-Ricardian
macroeconomics. In broad outline, macroeconomic policy making followed this
turn in academic thinking, as first monetary, and then fiscal,l policy fell
under the sway of conservative arguments that macroeconomic policy was at best
ineffective, and more likely detrimental to good macroeconomic performance.
Since the collapse of the dot-com bubble at the beginning of the new
millennium, activist macroeconomic policy has made a strong comeback. However,
as have some of the basic macroeconomic problems that had originally led Keynes
to develop his arguments in his General Theory.
第3章 欧州におけるマクロ経済政策 － 積極的安定化政策路線への回帰
か
Hans-Michael Trautwein (Carl von
Ossietzky,
Universität Oldenburg, Germany)
European
Macroeconomic Policy: a Return to Active Stabilization?
Is there
any return to activist stabilization strategies in European macroeconomic
policies? Have they ever been non-activist? Certainly, macroeconomic policies
in the core economies of the European Union since the 1980s can hardly be
described as Keynesian strategies of demand management. They are generally
interpreted as more restrictive and single-minded than their US counterpart.
Even though the ‘activist ineffectiveness’ literature that dominated mainstream
economics in the last quarter of the 20th century originated in North America,
it seems to have been taken more seriously in Europe. While the Fed allowed US
unemployment in the 1990s to fall below what was believed to be the NAIRU, and
while it actively mitigated the crisis after the dot.com bubble by way of
expansionary policy, the German Bundesbank and its successor, the European
Central Bank, seem to have been more successful in fighting inflation and
avoiding large fluctuations in output. Institutionally, at least, both the
Bundesbank and the ECB display(ed) most of the properties of operational
independence and rule-bound policy that the literature about dynamic
inconsistency and credibility considered to be optimal for avoiding the
pitfalls of demand management.
Only few commentators relate the relatively poor
performance of Germany and other EU economies in terms of employment and growth to the stance of
macroeconomic policy. Most of them attribute the persistently high unemployment
and low productivity growth in Europe to real rigidities in the goods and
labour markets. In the original EU-6 member states, at least, Keynesian
macroeconomics seems to be an outdated minority position. A mix of rule-bound
monetary policy with fiscal consolidation seems to be the consensus view,
regardless of occasional criticism of the growth and stability pact that
officially defines the framework of macroeconomic stabilization policy in the
Euro area.
This paper
takes issue with some myths about macroeconomic policies in the EU core.
Reviewing the macroeconomic performance of Germany and other countries in the
EMS era, it debunks the myth that “credibly” non-activist policies lower the
costs of disinflation. It shows how the macroeconomic performance of the EU
core can be explained in Keynesian terms. But it also rejects the view that
European macroeconomic policies before and after the introduction of the
European Monetary Union (EMU) were non-activist. The macroeconomic policy mixes
used the contexts of German reunification and European monetary integration can
both be interpreted as according with various of Keynes’s positions on
stabilization policy (for example, his views on the transfer problem, or the
Keynes Plan in the Bretton Woods negotiations), though not necessarily with
post-war concepts of Keynesian demand management. The punchline of the argument
is that EMU was and still is a project of active macroeconomic stabilization in
nominal and real terms, but that it required some coordinating rhetorics for
which the ‘policy irrelevance’ literature came in handy. Whether it ever was
(and will be) taken as seriously as mainstream economists tend to think, is a
matter of dispute.
第14章 現在のグローバル・インバランス － ケインズは貢献しうるか？
Current Global Imbalances. Might Keynes Be of Help?
Anna
Carabelli and Mario Cedrini
(Università del Piemonte Orientale, Italy)
A
large number of interpretations have been proposed for current global
imbalances. Competing views suggest peculiar prescriptions for their unwinding
and predict extremely different future scenarios for world economy. The
literature debate generally focuses on the sustainability of global imbalances.
The great divide is between alarming concerns for the risks the former pose for
world economic prospects and elegant theoretical justifications for their happy
persistence with uninterrupted global growth. Perhaps surprisingly, typical
literary reviews devote little attention to the type of adjustment, if any –
unilateral, bilateral or multilateral – each suggested scenario for the
imbalances’ unwinding is tied to. We thus propose to rearrange such views and
reformulate the overall problem accordingly by the use of the three
alternatives Keynes outlined in his 1945 memorandum “Overseas Financial Policy
in Stage III” for Britain’s economic recovery and the restart of global
multilateralism at the end of WWII.
There
seems to be a striking continuity in diversity between the two situations. The
lack of American assistance would have placed an overburdened Britain in a
“Starvation Corner”, with far from negligeable risks for global economy. “Made
in” interpretations about current imbalances, prompting for unilateral
adjustments, easily transform into the so-called “gloomy views” stressing
stress that a US recession, in particular, would likely result in a global
austerity programme. We suggest taking Keynes’s “Temptation” option, based on a
US business-character assistance to Britain, as a metaphor for the “imbalances
sustainability” views. Market mechanisms relying on the strength of the US
economy, on the one side, and/or the tacit agreement of a revived Bretton Woods
system on the other, would suffice to ensure stability. Keynes’s “Justice”
option called for a reconsideration of the adjustment burden between Britain,
the US and the Sterling Area countries, and was motivated by the recognition
of shared responsibility for a better
ordering of future economic intercourse. The parallel is here with current
views showing awareness of the multilateral character of the imbalances. Such
interpretations correctly assume that the needed multilateral response to
global imbalances masks a collective action problem undermining the case for
macro-economic coordination among the players involved.
Here
is where the rediscovery of Keynes’s legacy might come in as a helpful
preliminary guide to reassess the problem. Following David Vines’s (2003)
advice to revisitate the “focus and method” of Keynes’s “international
macroeconomics”, we try to stress the continuity between the method Keynes used to deal with global economic integration
and that which generally qualifies him as a thinker of complexity. Keynes’s
imaginative attempts to the problem of highly imbalanced international
relations were based on economic interdependence and recognition that the
defence of particular interests against those of the system as a whole would
have transformed them into a negative-sum game, to the detriment of the general
welfare. In the search for a shared vision about current global imbalances and
the conditions for their benign unwinding, Keynes might really be of help.
II. 『一般理論』をどう理解するかをテーマにするもの (5、7、9、11)
― トービン(5)、『一般理論』の数学性(7)、『一般理論』生成論(9)、人物像(11)
第5章 トービンのケインズ主義
Tobin’s Keynesianism
Robert W. Dimand (Brock University, Ontario, Canada)
Nobel laureate James Tobin first
read Keynes’s General Theory in September 1936 as an 18-year old sophomore
taking a Principles of Economics course, “being too young and ignorant to know
that I was too young and ignorant” to begin the study of economics with The
General Theory. The experience of first encountering economics during the
Depression and by reading Keynes shaped Tobin’s intellectual development, and
he remained proud to call himself an “Old Keynesian,” although J. R. Hicks and
Irving Fisher also influenced Tobin. It was fitting that when G. C. Harcourt
and P. A. Riach edited their so-called “Second Edition” of the General Theory
(1997), they invited Tobin to write the overview chapter, with the first half
of the chapter written “as J. M. Keynes.” In this paper, I examine what being
an Old Keynesian (rather than a New Keynesian, Post Keynesian, or New Classical
economist) meant to Tobin. Staking a distinctive claim to Keynes’s heritage,
Tobin criticized Post Keynesians for “throwing the away the insights of
neoclassical economics,” New Classical economists for sidestepping the central
macroeconomic problems of coordination and stability by assuming labor market
clearing and the existence of a representative agent, and the mainstream
American Keynesians of his own generation for insufficient attention to asset
markets and monetary policy. Tobin identified four central Keynesian
propositions, listed in order from the most widely accepted to the one most
distinctive of Tobin’s Keynesianism: (1) wages react slowly to excess demand
and especially to excess supply, so that over “a long short run,” fluctuations
in aggregate demand affect real output; (2) hence economies are vulnerable to
prolonged bouts of involuntary unemployment; (3) investment depends on appraisals
of profit expectations and risks that contain important elements of autonomy
and exogeneity; and, in accordance with Chapter 19 of The General Theory, (4)
“Even if money wages and prices were responsive to market excess demands and
supplies, their flexibility would not necessarily stabilize monetary economies
subject to demand and supply shocks.” Rather than try to prove the existence of
an unemployment equilibrium, Tobin viewed high unemployment as a protracted
disequilibrium. Drawing on Chapter 19 of Keynes’s General Theory, and later
also on Fisher’s debt-deflation theory of depressions, Tobin argued that, even
for a model with a unique full-employment equilibrium, the forces of
self-adjustment might be so weak that, without government intervention to
stimulate aggregate demand, the economy would never return to full employment
after a sufficiently large negative demand shock. This analysis captured the
intuition that Great Depressions sometimes happen, but not all the time: the
economy is self-adjusting for small shocks, but not for very large ones.
第7章 難解で数学的な議論 － 『一般理論』における数学的推論の利用
Keynes
and mathematics
Roger
E. Backhouse
(University of Birmingham, UK)
In
order to make clear the chasm that separates him from the formalism of modern
economics, scholars of Keynes have generally emphasised his comments on the
limitation of mathematical argumentation in economics. Representative is
perhaps Robert Skidelsky’s account, in his biography, of the way Keynes
attached great importance to intuition. Attention has also been paid to his
critique of Jan Tinbergen’s early econometric work, in which he argued that
this type of work faced inherent limitations.
The
aim of this paper is not to overturn these views, which contain an important
part of the truth about Keynes, but to broaden them and shed new light on them.
Keynes emphasis on intuition can be linked to the claims made in the lectures
recorded in Thomas Rymes’s book, that his mathematics offered a way of thinking
rather than a method of algebraic proof; that it was not helpful to see his
equations as algebra. In placing this in the context of Cambridge discussions
of logic and philosophy, from his father John Neville Keynes, to philosophers
such as G. E. Moore and Frank Ramsey, the paper will be charting material
already explored by others.
Where
the paper will adopt a new perspective is in taking more seriously the claim,
made my many reviewers of the General Theory, that the book was highly
mathematical. Though such comments were often made by non-economists, it is
argued that they should not be discounted completely. There are ways in which
the book, though it relies to an extent that is uncommon in modern economics on
verbal arguments that cannot be expressed in algebra, is highly mathematical.
By the standards of the time, its use of algebra was significant. Not only does
the book contain many equations, it exhibits a mathematical way of thinking, in
terms of functions and relationships. Even where symbolic representation is not
used, and even where it might be hard if not impossible to write a full
algebraic model, Keynes is using mathematical language.
In
addition to assessing the extent to which the book is mathematical overall, the
paper will try to analyse those parts of the argument where Keynes does use
mathematical notation, where he uses language that could have been expressed
symbolically but is not, and where he uses arguments that are simply verbal and
are best considered non-mathematical. It is intended that this will shed light
on why, unlike many influential books, Keynes’s General Theory has been read in
such different ways. The paper may substantiate an idea explored elsewhere in a
paper with David Laidler - “What was lost with IS-LM?”, namely that it was
dynamic arguments that were expressed in words, and the juxtaposition of such
arguments with algebraic analysis of static theory, helped promote what many
Keynesians have seen as the mis-reading of the General Theory by mainstream
economists.
第9章 ケインズの経済学の形成過程 平井俊顕
Keynes’s
Theory in the Making
Toshiaki
Hirai (Sophia Univ., Japan)
The
revolution in economics which Keynes’s General Theory (1936) brought about is,
needless to say, called the “Keynesian Revolution”. The General Theory was a
product of the intellectual journey of five years and half which started with
responding to both the internal and external criticisms of the Treatise (1930).
The present paper has two purposes. The first
is to clarify a feature of the Cambridge School through examination of the
business cycle theories which Cambridge economists tackled as principal
projects in the first half of the twentieth century. We would like
to pay attention to two streams. One is Marshallian stream, while the other is
Wicksellian stream as monetary economics (to which the Treatise belongs).
The second purpose is to analyze
Keynes’s theoretical development from the Treatise to the General Theory
through examining his books, his articles, various manuscripts, lecture notes
(very often taken by his students), and controversial correspondence.
The main conclusion of the second task is
summarized as follows:
(1) It is crucially important to pay attention
to the question of how Keynes dealt with the relation between profits and the
volume of output. In the Treatise, the importance of this relation (the “TM
supply function”) is stressed as expressing the dynamic mechanism. Keynes
adhered to this function after the Treatise, in spite of much criticism. Toward
the end of 1932, however, he abandoned it, though showing some hesitation, and
put forward a new formula of a system of commodity markets which led up to the
General Theory.
(2) The Treatise belongs to the Wicksell
Connection, which includes Myrdal, Lindahl, Mises, Hayek and others. We regard
it as propounding monetary economics critical of neoclassical orthodoxy. The
Treatise, however, included two theories: the “Wicksellian theory” and
“Keynes’s own theory”. Immediately after the Treatise, Keynes abandoned the
former theory, and strove to maintain or improve the latter. We regard Keynes
after the Treatise as having departed from the Wicksell’s influences, with the
result that the General Theory is completely independent of them.
(3) The General Theory’s revolutionary feature
lies in its showing, through a presentation of a clear-cut model, that the
market economy, if left to itself, falls into an underemployment equilibrium.
The model shows how the volume of employment is determined, on the basis of an
equilibrium analysis, contrary to the arguments of Post-Keynesians,
“Disequilibrium Approach” Keynesians, and others. It was not until 1933 that
Keynes came to put forward a model of how the volume of employment is
determined. Thereafter he took pains to elaborate his model, continuing to
revise the concept of effective demand, the concept of marginal efficiency of
capital, the theory of liquidity preference, and other things.
At the same time, however, we argue that in the General Theory
Keynes sees the market economy as possessing two contrasting potentialities:
stability, certainty, and simplicity on the one hand, and instability,
uncertainty, and complexity on the other.
第11章 ケインズと言葉の戦争
Keynes
and the war of words
Gilles Dostaler (University of Quebec at Montreal, Canada)
John Maynard Keynes worked out a new economic analysis
which served to justify the interventionist policies associated with his name.
But before being an economic theoretician, he defined himself as a publicist,
concerned to persuade his fellow citizens of the urgent necessity to carry out
transformations essential to avoid the breakdown of civilization. Keynes’s
influence is connected, not only to this economic theories, but also to a
political vision and a philosophic conception which he skillfully integrated
into his activities as publicist, advisor and theoretician. He was a man of
action, fully engaged in the problems of his time. The economic reforms he
advocated were but one element in a process of political and social
transformation necessary to save a world threatened by war, revolution and all
forms of extremism. Keynes proposed a global vision of society, its evils and
the means to overcome them. He left behind an enormous body of work. It is of substantial
literary quality and extends across many fields, from philosophy and economics
to history and politics. He excelled in all genres: abstract treatises or
pamphlets, academic or newspaper articles, official reports or personal
correspondences, statistical analyses, biographical essays. A master of the
spoken as well as the written word, his effectiveness as lecturer, conference
speaker, member and president of boards of directors, political activist,
member of various commissions and committees, negotiator of private and public,
particularly international, affairs, was unmatched. Accounts attesting to his skill at verbal
jousting abound. His life was characterized by combats in diverse battlefields.
At the age of 20, Keynes, then a student at Cambridge, presented a paper
written during the winter of 1902-1903 before a King’s College literary
society. Its subject was Abelard, lover of Eloise. He emphasized the former’s
struggles against the established political and religious powers of his time. He
praised the ‘dialectical skill’ of this philosopher who investigated the logic
of language and religious discourse and composed numerous hymns. But mostly he
admired him for having been inclined ‘rather to the war of words than to the
war of arms’. Keynes clearly felt kinship with the medieval philosopher. Like
Abelard, he rejected violence in spite of the glaring injustices he denounced
throughout his life and led a relentless war of words against the dominant
views of his time, as much in morality as in politics and economics. This
paper, which will draw upon an extensive research in Keynes Papers as well as
published documents, will present his life and work as a series of battles led
on different fronts. An emphasis will be put on the main weapon he used to lead
these battles. This weapon is language. Keynes was a master in the art of
rhetoric, which explains in great part his influence and success. The forms of
language he utilized are closely linked to the content of his message and to
the world view that he shared with his closest friends, the artists and writers
of the Bloomsbury Group. Art, which occupied the summit in the hierarchy of
human activities, was also an important battlefield for Keynes.
III. 『一般理論』17章をめぐるもの
(1) 現代金融理論の先駆として肯定的に見る見解 (12、13)
第12章 ケインズと現代国際金融論
Keynes and modern international
finance theory
Marcello de Cecco (Scuola
Normale Superiore di Pisa, Italy)
In this paper I make an experiment
in history of monetary theory: I try to mix
1) autobiographical reminiscences of my time at Chicago in 1966, as a
temporary exile from the English
Cambridge (to put into context )
2) the revival of an early article of mine dealing with Ch. XVII of Keynes’s General Theory, which was
occasioned by my reaction to Chicago’s anti-keynesianism, written in 1966 and a decade later buried in a
conference proceedings book published by an oscure Italian publisher and 3) a last section dealing with Keynes’s
seminal contribution to forward market theory and his anticipation of
behavioural finance theory and of other
aspects of modern finance theory.
第13章 現代経済学に対するケインズの影響 － ケインズのファイナンス理論および経済政策をめぐる若干の見過ごされた貢献
Keynes’s Influence on Modern Economics: Some Overlooked Contributions of Keynes’s
Theory of Finance and Economic Policy
Jan Kregel (Levy Economics
Institute of Bard College, New York)
Introduction
It is often argued that Keynes’s General
Theory dealt with macroeconomic aggregates of the real economy in conditions of
depression. As a result, many argued that the theory was not general and
required the addition of discussions of the economy in “normal conditions”, as
well as a discussion of the determinants of the nominal price level. In the
post-war period this was achieved through the discussion of the individual or
“microeconomic” decisions that produced the economic aggregates in terms of the
addition of classical individual optimization theory—what came to be called the
“micro” foundations of macroeconomics. The problem of nominal prices was
achieved through the addition of the short-run Phillips Curve. The result was
what came to be called the “neoclassical synthesis” and the “monetarist
counter-revolution” that paved the way for the rational expectations revolution
and the revival of pre-Keynesian classical economics.
Keynes’s
policy proposals were eviscerated in a similar way in what has come to be known
as “hydraulic” Keynesianism—the use of government tax and expenditure policies
to ensure that the level of aggregate expenditure is sufficient to produce full
employment. The emergence of stagflation—the simultaneous occurrence of rising
unemployment and rising prices—in the 1950s, and high levels of inflation in
the 1970s, created a policy paradox in which fiscal policy could not
simultaneously be expansive to support full employment levels of demand and
restrictive to reduced excess demand and fight inflation. This brought a return
to monetary policy as the instrument seen as most appropriate to fight
inflation and produce price stability, supported by supply-side tax incentives
as the instrument most appropriate to support employment and economic growth.
Thus, Keynes’s approach to monetary policy through influencing expectations of
long-term interest rates was replaced by control of the growth of monetary
aggregates, and Keynesian fiscal policy ceased to have a macroeconomic
objective, but was instead directed towards increasing private incentives
through the reduction of the role of government in the economy and reduction of
marginal tax rates to increase investment incentives. The overall level of
fiscal stimulus and interest rates thus became residuals, completely reversing
Keynes’s approach.
The
failure of monetarist money growth targeting eventually forced recognition of
the endogeneity of money and a return to policy focus on interest rates and
expectations. But not on expectations of long term rates, but rather on
expectations of future inflation rates in the form of “inflation targeting”.
The failure of supply-side tax reductions and reductions in government
activities to provide fiscal balance led to ad hoc budgetary rules to ensure
that any new fiscal expenditures were matched with new funding measures.
However,
the sharp declines in activity and asset prices during the collapse of the
dot-com bubble, the post 9-11 downturn, and the current sub-prime crisis has
brought frequent breaches of these principles in favor of a naive type of
pre-Keynesian policy in which direct income transfers to support private
expenditure and direct liquidity injections to support financial institutions
have become the rule rather than the exception. Policymakers appear to have
returned to the hydraulic form of Keynesian policy, but lost the theoretical
basis that supports it. The reason stems from the initial belief mentioned
above, that Keynes’s theory was based on the ability to forecast the reaction
of economic aggregates expressed in real terms to expenditure policy measures.
However, a review of the body of Keynes’s work shows this emphasis on the
behavior of real economic aggregates does not represent his contribution to
economic theory or policy. This paper will review the innovative contribution
of Keynes’s major works and show how they were unified in his General Theory
(Keynes 1936) in a policy that is radically different from that normally
presented, criticized, and currently employed, as Keynesian theory.
(2) スラッファによる否定的評価(10)
第10章 ケインズとスラッファ、そして後者の「隠された懐疑」
Keynes and Sraffa
Heinz D. Kurz (University of Graz
and Graz Schumpeter Centre, Austria)
The paper discusses Piero Sraffa’s
views on, and criticism of, elements of John Maynard Keynes’s The General
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Keynes had brought Sraffa to
Cambridge and thought very highly of the erudition, scholarship and originality
of the Italian economist. The two were on friendly terms with one another and
they collaborated in various ways. Sraffa initiated the so-called ‘Cambridge
Circus’, a group of Cambridge economists who discussed Keynes’s Treatise on
Money and then The General Theory and who conveyed their comments to Keynes.
Due to his friendship with Keynes, Sraffa was very discreet as to what he
thought of Keynes’s work. It was only after Trinity College, Cambridge, opened
Sraffa’s manuscripts and correspondence to the academic public that some hitherto
unknown notes and manuscript fragments and Sraffa’s annotations in his personal
copy of The General Theory came to light and could be studied. The paper
focuses attention on this hitherto unpublished material. In particular, it
discusses Sraffa’s criticism of Keynes’s liquidity preference theory. Sraffa
accuses Keynes of committing a number of blunders and of arguing not correctly.
Keynes had adopted the concept of ‘commodity rates of interest’ which Sraffa
had put forward in his criticism of Friedrich August von Hayek’s monetary
overinvestment theory of the business cycle. Alas, as Sraffa shows, Keynes had
not well understood or rather misunderstood the concept. Sraffa was also
critical of Keynes’s theory of investment and the concept of the marginal efficiency
of capital. This concept could not generally be sustained in economic systems
characterized by a circular flow of production, that is, a complex
interdependence of industries. In such systems there is no presumption that the
‘forces’ as contemplated by the received Marshallian doctrine, on which Keynes
relied to a great extent, can be relied upon. In particular, there is no reason
to rely on an investment demand that is elastic with the level of the money
rate of interest.
IV. 現在マクロ経済学をめぐるもの
(1) マクロ理論の新旧潮流をめぐる比較分析 (6、4) ― 比較理論史
第6章 新しい新古典派総合とヴィクセル=ケインズ・コネクション
Mauro
Boianovsky (Universidade de Brasília, Brasil)
Hans-Michael
Trautwein (Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg, Deutchland)
The New Neoclassical Synthesis and the
Wicksell-Keynes Connection
Progress
in macroeconomics is often expressed in the dialectic terms of controversies
between neoclassical and Keynesian views. Most of the time, however, there is
search for common ground, and the “New Neoclassical Synthesis” (NNS), which is
based on New Classical concepts of intertemporal optimization and New Keynesian
market structures, is the most recent example of such quest for consensus.
Probably the most authoritative contribution to the NNS literature is Michael
Woodford’s voluminous Interest and Prices (2003), which attempts an even wider
synthesis by including various elements of pre-Keynesian macroeconomics.
Woodford refers, both by the title of the book and by renaming the core NNS
model a “neo-Wicksellian framework”, to the monetary theories of Knut Wicksell
and his early followers, in particular Friedrich A. Hayek, Erik Lindahl and
Gunnar Myrdal. He interprets the NNS as a more rigorous reformulation of the
dynamics of interest rates, inflation and output gaps that were at the heart of
early Wicksellian economics.
In our
paper, we discuss two questions: What are the main parallels and differences
between the original Wicksellian approach(es) and Woodford’s neo-Wicksellian
framework? And to which extent can Woodford’s approach deal with the issues
raised by Wicksell and his followers, including Keynes? We examine these two
questions – not as an exercise in exegetic exactness, but as an attempt to find
out what remains, after Woodford’s Interest and Prices, of original Wicksellian
theory that may be of more than purely historical interest. Section 2 of the
paper describes Woodford’s “neo-Wicksellian framework” in terms of
intertemporal optimization in terms of an IS relation, a New Keynesian Phillips
curve, and a monetary policy reaction function in terms of a Taylor rule.
Section 3 identifies the similarities of this approach with original
Wicksellian theory, while section 4 examines the differences. We draw special
attention to Lindahl’s approach because it is most similar to Woodford’s and
yet serves to bring out essential contrasts between the old Wicksellians and
the new synthesis. Moreover, these contrasts also help to see crucial
differences between the approach of Keynes and the old and new Neoclassical
Syntheses. As Leijonhufvud (1981) has argued, Keynes had a “Wicksell
Connection” in the view that failures of the market rate of interest to
coordinate investment and saving ex ante result in excess demands (positive or
negative) in goods and/or labour markets, and that those excess demands cannot
be cured by price or wage adjustments, as long as the market rate of interest
fails to converge on a level that is compatible with full employment at stable
prices. This perspective is lost in the NNS. Section 5 explores the grounds
where the Wicksell Connections of Keynes and Woodford diverge. We argue that
the New Neoclassical Synthesis cannot deal with some of the issues that were at
the heart of the original Wicksellian and Keynesian approaches and that should
still be at the centre of macroeconomic research.
第4章 ケインジアン＝新古典派総合の「旧」から「新」へ － １つの解釈
From
the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ keynesian-neoclassical synthesis: an exploration and an
interpretation
Richard Arena (University of Nice, France)
The purpose of the contribution is a comparison
between the conditions of birth and the theoretical contents of both so-called
“Keynesian-Neoclassical synthesis” (KNS) which respectively emerged in 1936
(with Hicks) and in 1997 (with Goodfriend and King). This comparison between
the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ KNCS might come at first sight as a surprise: Sixty
years took place between both ‘synthesis’ and our society, the state of
economic thought and the intellectual context of social sciences knew
substantial changes in the meanwhile. We would like to show however that a
careful investigation of both ‘synthesis’ show that the enterprise is worth to
be undertaken. Essential differences do not prevent some crucial similarities
which permit to understand better the opposition between Keynesian and
Neoclassical approaches. The paper includes three parts. The first
part stresses the historical and intellectual contexts of both synthesis and
emphasises how they emerged and which were their respective interpretations of Keynes‘s
research program. Now, the historical contexts as well as the predominant
interpretations of Keynes’s economic contribution substantially differed in
1936 and 1997: Keynes continued to write during the first ‘synthesis’ and
therefore obliged macroeconomists to permanent reactions and
re-interpretations, while the second one tried to combine in a General
Equilibrium framework various ‘Keynesian’ features which themselves resulted
from previous interpretations. These differences deserve to be pointed out and
carefully explained. They should not however hide some crucial analytical
similarities which allow a better understanding of the deep nature of the
theoretical border which divides neoclassical and Keynesian economists. The
last two parts rather focus on these theoretical similarities but also
differences between both ‘synthesis’. The second
part of the paper is thus devoted to the notion of economic rationality. We
first investigate its instrumental side, showing that, far from being attached
to the new synthesis, the generalization process of rational economic choice to
consumption, investment and monetary behaviours was already being implemented
in a somewhat different way after 1936. We also consider its cognitive aspect
and especially the treatment of uncertainty and of the expectations formation
process which substantially differs according to the specific synthesis
considered. The third part of our paper is dedicated to the working of the
different macro-markets (including the labour, the money and the goods
markets). Two major issues will be here considered. The first focuses on the
various assumptions of stickiness and flexibility which concern the main
variables that permit or do not permit macroeconomic adjustments. The second
contrasts the global short term macro-equilibrium of the old KNCS and its
relation with a long tem balanced growth path with the dynamical stochastic
general equilibrium of the new KNCS. Finally, conclusion draws from the three
parts of the paper the elements of a brief investigation of the common
analytical background of the extension of the general economic equilibrium
theory research program and of the difficulties which one should face if she
tries to insert it into a Keynesian intellectual and scientific project.
(2) 理論モデルの提示 (2,8)
第2章 日本の長期不況と経済政策
Stagnation Dynamics and Japan's Long-run Stagnation
Yoshiyasu
Ono
(Osaka
University, Japan)
Japan
has long been facing serious stagnation since the stock-price bubble burst in
the early 1990’s. The government has been moving back and forth between the
demand- and the supply-side views. It sometimes chose Keynesian expansionary
policies and in others adopted neoclassical contractionary policies that were called
‘structural reform’. The R. Hashimoto and J. Koizumi administrations typically
took the latter, but the economic performance was particularly bad under them.
Using a dynamic stagnation model I examine the effects on employment and
consumption of various structural-reform policies and compare them with those
that obtain in the conventional neoclassical model and the Keynesian model.
There were three time periods in which the economic growth rate
was negative in Japan. The first was 1993-94 under M. Hosokawa, the second was
1997-98 under R. Hashimoto and the third was 2001-02 under J. Koizumi. Among
those Hashimoto and Koizumi insisted that the stagnation was caused by various
supply-side inefficiencies and urged firms to dismiss surplus employees,
promoted exit of inefficient firms, and cut fiscal spending, especially
public-work related budget, to reduce the government size. They believed these
policies to recover the overall efficiency. However, under their reforms the
unemployment rate rapidly increased and stagnation became worse. Moreover,
their understanding of the Japanese economy seems somewhat incorrect. The size
of the Japanese government was in fact one of the smallest among OECD
countries. It was also hard to believe that the Japanese supply side, which was
believed to be the world most efficient in 1980s, suddenly became the most
inefficient in the 1990s and caused stagnation to occur.
In contrast, Keynesians insisted that fiscal expansion created new
demand and hence recovered business activity through the multiplier effect.
However, the multiplier was estimated to be much smaller than they stated and
hence they were criticized.
I discuss the effects of these neoclassical and Keynesian policies
in the dynamic optimization framework in which persistent stagnation occurs and
explore why they did not produce such effects as expected. It is shown that
people’s desire for liquidity holding reduces consumption, causing deflation to
arise, which makes holding money more advantageous and reduces consumption. In
this situation the effects on consumption of
various policies implemented under the name of ‘structural reform’, such as an
increase in productivity, improving price/wage adjustment and a decrease in the
government size, are completely opposite to those obtained in the neoclasical
model. Whereas they increase private consumption in the neoclassical model,
they lower employment and reduce private consumption in the present model, as
experienced in Japan.
The Keynesian multiplier effect, which obtains owing to neglect of
the budget equation, does not work either since the standard dynamic budget
equation is taken into account. Nevertheless, it is shown that public works spending raises employment and
consumption. It is because it reduces the deflationary gap and hence makes it
more advantageous for people to consume than to accumulate money.
第8章 『一般理論』― 確率的マクロ均衡概念序説
The
General Theory : Toward the Concept of Stochastic Macro-equilibrium
Hiroshi
Yoshikawa (University of Tokyo)
This
paper surveys the controversies surrounding the General Theory. First, we review the early reactions of such
economists as Leontief, Hicks, Schumpeter, and Modigliani. Modigliani established the long-lived thesis
that the Keynesian economics makes sense under the assumption of inflexible
wages/prices.
In section 2, we take up the up and down of
the Phillips curves during the 1960’s.
During the 60’s, some economists kept asking themselves what was the
essence of Keynes’ economics or the General Theory in the light of the
neoclassical theory. Clower, for
example, made it clear that the General Theory or the Keynesian economics
presumes that the economy is quantity-constrained, or more generally,
imperfectly competitive. Meanwhile,
Friedman (1968) in his famous AEA presidential address rejected the existence
of a widely accepted down and sloping Phillips curve in the long-run. According to Friedman, the trade-off only
temporarily exists between unexpected inflation and the unemployment rate. Section 3 discusses the neoclassical
macroeconomics such as Lucas’ rational expectations model, and Kydland-Prescott
real business cycle theory.
In the heyday of the neoclassical
macroeconomics, the reaction on the part of “Keynesians” is basically old wine
in new bottles! Many researchers
attempted to “rationalize” inflexible prices/wages for they took inflexible
prices/wages as the kernel of the Keynesian economics. These research efforts were summarized by
Mankiw and Romer (1991) under the heading of “New Keynesian Economics.” In section 4, we discuss New Keynesian
Economics.
New
Keynesian economics made a strong impact on the profession during the
1980’s. However, it is, in our view,
fundamentally misguided. Most works of
New Keynesian economics take the aggregate demand as synonymous with nominal
money supply; see e.g. Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), Mankiw (1985) and other
works collected in Mankiw and Romer (1991).
It is not surprising to find Mankiw and Romer (1991, p. 3) saying that
“much of new Keynesian economics could also be called new monetarist
economics.” Thus, in this approach the
primary agenda is to explain the rigidity or inflexibility of nominal
price/wage in concurrence with “rationality” of economic agents. This is in accordance with that textbook
cliché that Keynesian economics makes sense only when prices are rigid: Old
wine! Effective demand in Keynes (1936)
is, however, real.
Section
5 introduces the reader to the concept of stochastic macro-equilibrium. Keynes’ General Theory is a bold challenge to
the neoclassical theory. In the General
Theory, Keynes pointed out that the utilization if production factors is not
full, and, therefore, that factor endowment is not an effective determinant of
equilibrium. Keynesian economics has
been long debated in relation to unemployment, particularly a very ambiguous
notion of “involuntary” unemployment, and the rigidity of, prices/wages. For Keynes’ economics to make sense, it is
enough to assume that there is under employment in the sense that the marginal
products are not uniform at the highest level.
In effect, what Keynes said in the General Theory is that in
demand-constrained equilibrium, productivity of a production factor differs
across firms and industries. We explain
that stochastic macroequilibium provides proper microfoundations for Keynes’
principle of effective demand.
