On Ralph Hawtrey’s Thought and Things
– Struggling to Build a Bridge between “Theory of Aspects” and “Science”
Toshiaki Hirai
(Sophia University)
1. Introduction
Hawtrey (1879-1975) is
well-known as an economist who developed a monetary theory of economic
fluctuations in, e.g. Good and Bad Trade
[Hawtrey, 1913] and Trade and Credit
[Hawtrey, 1928] as well as advocating the so-called “Treasury View” - in
contrast with Keynes’s understanding. Furthermore, he was severely critical of
Keynes as the author of the Treatise from his own theoretical
stance.
Predominant in Hawtrey’s intellectual background was Cambridge
– among other things, his experience as an Apostle was of great significance –
although he was not to spend his academic life there. He worked as the only
economist within the Treasury, which he entered after graduation and where he stayed
until retirement.
In the field of social philosophy he
published two books – The Economic Problem1 [Hawtrey, 1926], and Economic Destiny [Hawtrey, 1944]. In
addition, he left an unpublished book, Right Policy: The Place of Value
Judgements in Politics, which was judged to have been written in the
evening of his life (Hawtrey Papers, 12/2. Composed of 18 chapters, 528 sheets
of typescript) 2. This critically examines the sphere of economics,
sociology and political science, based on Moore’s ethics - including “the
impossibility of the definition of goodness”. “Value Judgements” in the
subtitle indicates judgements in view of (what he calls) “true ends”).
What the present paper aims at, on the other
hand, is Hawtrey’s philosophy which underlies his economic theory and social
philosophy. Although he had taken an interest in philosophy throughout his life,
he expressed his own philosophical view in only one unpublished book, Thought
and Things (Hawtrey Papers, 12/1. Composed of 8 chapters, and 314 sheets of
typescript). Although it is unclear at what stage of his development this was
written, he dedicates a great deal of room to discussion of A Materialist
Theory of Mind (Armstrong [1968]), showing it was written in his last years.
Thought and Things has the following
TOC: Ch.1 Aspects, Ch.2 Cause, Ch.3 Purpose, Ch.4 Thought, Ch.5 Truth and
Inference, Ch.6 Science, Ch.7 Philosophy, Ch.8 Man and His World.
The present paper runs as follows. Firstly, the
theory of aspects which should be the substance of Hawtrey’s philosophy is
examined. Secondly, we consider his basic
ideas on mind and matter.
Finally, we evaluate his philosophy taking into account the context of
philosophical currents in Cambridge at that time.
No one seems to have studied Thought and
Things3 so far, which may justify examination of it in a
heuristic way. The vivid impression that I have received of the book as a whole
is that it should be read in terms of an intellectual struggle searching for a
bridge between a theory of aspect peculiar to Hawtrey and scientific knowledge.
The main theme of this paper lies precisely here.
2. Theory of Aspect
2.1 Fundamental framework
To put Hawtrey’s philosophy
in a nutshell, it may be seen as “a theory of aspect” 4. He put
forward the main theme of Thought and
Things in the Preface as follows.
The leading
theme of this book is the analysis of thought into the discernment of aspects
in conscious experience. A predicate is an aspect of a subject. A relation is
an aspect of two or more related terms.
The mind,
in discerning an aspect, makes contact with truth, but only
with
truth about its own experience. (Preface, pp.1-2)
Taking this as the starting
point, let us examine the fundamental framework of the theory of aspect argued
in the book. (Incidentally, although “A predicate is … related terms.” is very
difficult to understand, it is quoted here due to its importance. The meaning
is made clearer on p.150, which we will deal with in Section 3.1 below.)
The main element is Mind. Before the mind, the field
of consciousness which the mind can access expands. In other words, the mind
creates the field of consciousness through making consciousness work.
What, then, does the main take as its object? In a
word, “things”. However, the mind cannot get hold of things directly. It brings
them into the field of consciousness, in fact, by means of the “senses” (sight,
touch, hearing and so forth), that is, “sense experience”. This is called
“conscious experience”, as a result of which “aspects” emerge.
The mind discerns some aspects from multiple aspects
which appear in the field of consciousness. That is, “The discernment of an
aspect is an activity of the mind exercised upon a state of the mind” (Preface,
pp.1-2).
Although Hawtrey holds that an aspect potentially
comes into being in the field of consciousness, he does not think that it
objectively exists, independently of the mind. The mind discerns aspects which
potentially exist, and aspects are not considered able to exist without the
mind. In the above quotation, “The mind, in discerning an aspect, makes contact
with truth, but only with truth about its own experience; as “but only …”, it
should be noted in particular that truth is established only in relation to the
mind’s experience.
… discernment of an aspect can only be true. That is so
because the aspect is inherent in an experience which is wholly present
to the mind. The mind notices an aspect which is already there to be selected
for notice (my emphasis added, pp. 3-4).
An aspect is an aspect to the mind, and claims no independent
existence. (p.123)
Let us recapitulate what have seen so far. The mind
sees, a thing, say, a “chair”. Several aspects, through sense experience, “sight”,
enter the field of consciousness of the mind, such as “it is made of wood; it
has four legs; it is brown” and so forth. It depends on the state of mind how
many of such aspects the mind can discern. This discernment is (the first form
of) “thought”.
Concerning the nature of aspect, another
point is worth noting, namely that an aspect exists as a part of the whole in
an inseparable way.
An aspect has its own
field, which is so much of the entire field as contributes
to it. But the aspect is not a part of its field. (p. 11)
… when we discern a part of any object, is not the
part discerned an aspect of the whole? No, the aspect discerned is not the
separable part but the relation of the part to the whole. (pp. 11-12)
What this means is that a
part discerned should not be regarded as a portion separable from the whole,
but as a part to the whole.
What calls for particular attention here is the
existence of things; Hawtrey argues that the mind cannot possibly prove existence.
What the mind receives is aspects only. However, as will be seen in Section 2,
he is inclined to grasp aspects as intersubjective, or even implies that they
are more objective, and more trans-time.
“The whole field of consciousness” is not confined to
the field of consciousness mind can make contact with through “sense
experience” – such as recognition of a person’s face, appreciation of paintings
. Besides these, several states which are induced within the mind – from moral,
feeling, volition, thought, concept through uncertainty, probability to
mathematical propositions, mathematical inference, empirical inference – are
also grasped in terms of aspects. The whole field of consciousness is
considered to be composed of these two fields (cf.p.209. Fig.1)5.
Before proceeding to explain aspects obtained in these
two fields, the first point to consider is why Hawtrey came to choose, as the
title of this book, Thought and Things rather than A Theory of Aspect,
for the title holds deep implications regarding his conception of philosophy.
“Thought”, as we have seen, refers to the mind’s
action in discerning aspects, epitomizing the theory of aspect which he attributed
with a central role in Thought and Things. On the other hand, “Things” are
what science sets as the object of research, epitomizing science. Thus he chose
the title, Thought and Things, as implicating “A Theory of Aspect and
Science”.
These two words are proposed with the
following implications. On the one hand,
they are presented as
contrasting, although both are equally recognized. On the other hand, a way to
organise or integrate them systematically6 is sought.
(Fig.１) The Whole Field of Consciousness
|
The whole field of consciousness the field
accessible through
sense experience
（ex.：recognition of a person’s
face,
appreciation of paintings)
the states induced within the mind
（moral, feeling, volition,
thought, concept）
(uncertainty, probability)
(mathematical proposition, mathematical inference, empirical
inference) and so forth
|
In the theory of aspect, the existence of
things is presupposed. The mind can neither prove their existence nor have
means to recognize it correctly. Based on these recognitions the theory of
aspect is developed. Meanwhile, in science the existence of things is also
presupposed at the root of theory. Science cannot prove their existence. Despite
these circumstances, the two fields of knowledge have been developed. Nevertheless,
Hawtrey does not shirk the question: Should we allow this “dualism” to go on?
Starting from this
fundamental recognition, Hawtrey proposes his theory of aspect as a philosophy
of the field which science cannot grasp. We saw at the beginning of this paper
that Hawtrey stated that “The leading theme of this book is the analysis of
thought into the discernment of aspects in conscious experience”. This
statement follows from the above recognition, which is summed up in the title, Thought
and Things.
2.2 Aspect Obtained through
Sense Experience
Let us take an example of an aspect obtained through
sense experience.
Suppose that there is a chair in front of a person. The
mind of the person grasps some aspects through sense experience such as seeing
(sight) or touching (touch) it.
Here we must bear in mind the distinction between
things and aspects. Hawtrey argues that one cannot prove the existence of
things, which may show some affinity to Kant’s “thing in itself”. It is the aspects
which appear in relation to a chair that the mind can discern through sense
experience. Aspects stand in relation to a chair, and are to be discerned by the
mind – they do not exist independently of the mind. Of the aspects which emerge
before the mind, what the mind is able to discern become aspects. If not, they
remain hidden, argues Hawtrey. For example, an artist can discern some aspects in
painting that the majority of people fail to perceive.
Although aspects may be “intersubjective” in
the sense that they simultaneously appear in the two minds, this does not mean
that they exist outside the two minds. Aspects could be defined as
“intersubjective” existence in the field of consciousness.
How could we be sure that anything besides
one’s mind really exists? What exists outside one’s mind should be recognizable
only when one’s mind discerns it at the level of aspects in the field of
consciousness. Aspects thus discerned are accumulated in one’s mind, argues
Hawtrey.
Let us compare the theory of sense-data7
and the theory of aspect. What is similar is
that the former argues that the
mind gets data from the object through sense experience, while the latter
argues that the mind gets an aspect from the object through sense experience.
What is different is that the former regards the data as subjective while the
latter regards the aspect as intersubjective, appearing in the field of
consciousness. It should be noted that the theory of aspect takes into
consideration the states induced in the mind as well.
Fussert’s “Noema” might correspond to what
integrates various aspects. For Noema, which is not true reality, is obtained
by grasping things consciously through sense experience (“things as objects of
consciousness”). However, as Noema is considered to be subjective, it is
different from aspects.
So far we have stated that aspects, existing in
the field of consciousness, are to be seen as intersubjective. However, the
word, “intersubjective” here implies that aspects appear widely in the minds of
many people. In this sense, this word comes closer to “objective”, as is borne
out in Hawtrey’s argument on Platonic ideas.
… the foundation of the Platonic theory was the
independent reality of the ideas. Their reality meant something different from
the reality of things existing in time and space. … So l should be inclined to
say that all aspects exist timelessly in the same way as the Platonic
ideas.（p.273）
Suppose that, say, there is a chair in front
of ten people. There exist ten minds, each of which forms ten fields of
consciousness through sense experience vis-à-vis the chair. In these
circumstances there potentially exist several aspects which are commonly seen
in these fields of consciousness. How many aspects are discerned will depend on
the state of each mind. Thus interpreted, aspects are intersubjective, and with
an increasing number of minds the aspects may approach an “objective” condition.
2.3 Aspects Obtained as the
States Induced in the Mind
The field of consciousness
is not only open to sense experience but also extends through the states
induced within the mind (cf. Fig. 1 and p.209), which may include, for example:
moral, feeling, volition, thought, concept; uncertainty, probability;
mathematical propositions, mathematical inferences, empirical inferences.
They are different, in nature, from the
aspects obtained through sense experience, for they are aspects which are
induced in the mind, to a certain extent independent of the outer world. Let us
take thought, concepts, knowledge, which Hawtrey mentioned as representative.
(The others are kept for other occasions).
(a) Thought
“Thought” is discernment of
an aspect. Hawtrey states that “I would go further and say that all thought
consists in the discernment of aspects of experience. … Each possible thought
consists in noticing a particular aspect, that is to say, selecting this aspect
for attention from the whole field of consciousness” (p.109).
Thought centers
around a proposition. It establishes itself, choosing aspects and combining
them. The aspects thus chosen and discerned are either “attributes” or
“relations” (cf. p.150). That is, by combining aspects as “attributes” and
those as “relations”, a thought establishes itself. While sense experience is
simultaneous, thought is characterised by inference.
Thought may belong to the stage next to
intuitive aspects, which have no interpretation – that is, the stage when an
interpretation of experience is made.
This is clear in the following.
This passage has much the
same meaning as the following part of the first quotation in this paper – “A
predicate is an aspect of a subject. A relation is an aspect of two or more
related terms”. That is, “an aspect of a subject” is “an intuitive aspect”
while “a relation … terms” corresponds to “the interpretation of experience”.
(b) Concept
With regard to what occurs
within the mind in relation to a concept, two terms are proposed – familiarity
and association.
Familiarity is
a feeling attached to a concept (cf. p.143). It has two types (cf. p.135). One
is the familiarity with the particular past occurrences of an aspect, to which
associations point. This occurs in the initial stage of the formation of a
concept. The other is the familiarity with the concept itself, which develops
thereafter. The associations usually stop there.
The mind embraces several aspects accordingly
as, through a certain “familiarity”, associations continue to be induced. By
combining these aspects a certain “concept” comes into being (cf. p. 144)8.
A concept is an abstraction, and an aspect is
elaborated by interpretation. If a certain aspect is familiarized, it becomes a
starting point for associations. By following it, the mind can search for its
past experience through “memory”.
(c) Knowledge
“Knowledge” is a belief
grounded on several aspects discerned (cf. pp.151, 199). Knowledge accumulated
in the mind is composed of “familiarized” aspects and “familiarized” concepts
(cf. p.154).
We may put it thus. A combination of aspects, through
which a concept is formed, becomes familiar through repetitive occurrence of a
particular type (cf. p.145). A façade of aspects through which a concept is
recognized becomes a key to a series of “associations” (cf. p.163).
Upon the stock of memories and concepts is built the
structure of thoughts or beliefs constituting knowledge. (p.150)
The concept is the subjects of which the aspects are predicates and
relations.
(p.141).
What we have so far seen is summarized in
Fig.2.
（Fig.2）Thought, Concept, Knowledge
|
Thought － Discernment of an aspect. Inferential. The stage at
which an interpretation of experience is made.
Concept － Several aspects combined through association of
familiarity by the mind.
Knowledge ― Belief grounded on several
aspects discerned.
“Knowledge” accumulated within the mind = “familiar” aspects +
“familiar” concepts
|
3. Mind and Matter
3.1 The Main Theme
As already pointed out, the
title of Hawtrey’s book, “Thought and Things”, which the present paper intends
to examine, has the implication of “A Theory of an Aspect and Science”, which
could be also expressed as “Mind and Matter”.
Hawtrey takes both mental occurrences, such
as thought, imagination, feeling, volition and material objects, as “facts”.
This is characteristic of his broad approach. He argues that although a “thing
in itself” should be unrecognizable, the mind can discern aspects through sense
experience, while he accepts scientific knowledge by recognizing the existence
of “material objects” – he seems to make a philosophical effort to incorporate scientific
knowledge into the theory of aspect.
Mental occurrences are, as we have seen, the principal
actors of Hawtrey’s theory of aspect, and he argues that they are “facts”.
What is presented to the mind is either sense
experience or the operation of the mind itself, thought, imagination, feeling
or volition. These mental occurrences are facts. (p.209)
At the same time, he argues
that material objects are “facts” as well. In his argument here, a “causal
hypothesis” appears in relation to sense experience, in which material
substance is included as fact. Arguing along this line, he seems to be considering
how “a theory of aspect” should be connected with “science”.
If one were to focus solely on the mind and
confine attention to a “theory of aspect” in which sense experience and the
states induced within the mind appear, one could not explain the world which
science has so far explored. Moreover, the states induced within the mind, as
we have seen, include not only thought and concepts but also mathematical
propositions, mathematical inferences and empirical inference, all of which are
used as indispensable tools in science. If this is the case we must recognise
the fundamental importance of a philosophy which is not driven away by science,
exploring how the “theory of aspect” could be compatible with “science”. For
Hawtrey, inquiry in this direction appears to be the essential challenge.
“It does not address the true solution to
argue mind and matter separately. But philosophy which stresses material only
and neglects mind misses the fundamental problem.” – According to Hawtrey, as
science has developed, philosophy, which neglects or ignores the philosophical
point of view which focuses on mind, has become more and more influential.
Logical positivism and behaviorism are emblematic of this trend. In his philosophy
Hawtrey shows a keenly critical attitude towards these tendencies. Let us
consider a passage, though a little long, which makes this point clear.
Sense experience puts in a claim to be something more
than mental, in that it seems to be imposed on the mind by some agency other
than the mind. And the causal hypothesis supports the claim by tracing sense
experience through chains of causation to matter.
The
causal hypothesis, in the form which we instinctively believe, includes the reality
of matter. We take the outside agency of causation to be a fact, and each
particular material object to be a fact. And, as I have shown, other human
beings are given the status of facts, independently of the reality of matter.
Their thoughts and feelings are held to be facts like one’s own. When I think about an actual material object,
my thought is one fact and the material object is another.
A
material object embodies the concept of its kind, and exhibits the aspects
contained in the concept, together with the Aristotelian accidents, aspects
which belong to it as an empirical particular and are not deducible from the
concept.
Thoughts
and feelings form part of the field of consciousness and exhibit aspects and
concepts, though they do not fit into kinds so simply as material objects. (p.209)
A characteristic common to all the mental occurrences
of which experience consists is that they are real. Reality is an aspect
discerned in them, and the causal hypothesis extends to matter the same concept
of reality that is discerned in experience. That is an inevitable inference
from the hypothesis which traces sense experience to causes emanating
from a world of material objects. (p.211)
Insofar as the human being
is an entity that recognizes everything through the action of the mind, science
by scientists cannot be explored without this procedure. The above passage, “A material object embodies
the concept of its kind, and exhibits the aspects contained in the concept,
together with … from the concept” is grounded precisely on this recognition. “A
material object” is related to a “concept” and an “aspect”.
The following passage also shows his stance
in moving on beyond “dualism” (separation between mind and matter), by pointing
out the relation between the “theory of aspect” and “science”.
The discernment of an aspect is an activity of the
mind exercised upon a state of the mind, but the common aspect of the field of
consciousness and the nature posited by science is the essential link between
mind and fact. (Preface, pp.1-2)
An aspect which exists in
the field of consciousness according to the theory of aspect, and is nature as
posited by science should constitute an essential link between mind and fact.
Hawtrey does not take the view that ascribes substance
to matter alone (i.e. Materialism). He argues that the causal hypothesis, which
“takes over the concepts of reality and of extension over time, and applies
them to matter, … does not absolutely require the reality to have all the
characteristics attributed to matter”. (p.253b)
However, Hawtrey reveals
that his own theory of aspects has some problems as well.
But the dualism which makes reality consist of matter
and mind, and allows importance only to mind, is far from satisfying the requirements
of logos.
I have suggested at the end of
Chapter VI that Professor Armstrong’s form of materialism might supersede this
dualism. Matter would be the only form of existence, while mind would be a real
activity of matter. Any genuine simplification in philosophy may be presumed to
be in harmony with logos. At the
same time I do not think a simplification of the concept of substance goes far
towards rationalising the causal hypothesis. The concept of matter as the
substance in which causal efficacy is rooted, is a mere token of reality. An anthropocentric philosophy does not fit
into a material universe, in which man occupies a physically insignificant
place. (p.310)
3.2 Science
As we have seen, Hawtrey
sets out his “theory of aspect” as the main pillar of his philosophy. At the
same time, however, he recognizes the role which “science” has played, and
tries to see how it could be compatible with the “theory of aspect”. However, in
Thought and Things he does not arrive at a final solution. Together with
“Thought and Things”, we find expressions such as “A Theory of Aspect and
Science”, “Mind and Material”, “Mind and Facts”. All of them are expressions
showing how this dualism could be avoided.
That said, let us see how he takes the
problem which science or philosophy of science finds itself faced with.
Hawtrey does not
see the theory of aspect and science as being built on different principles. He
tries to view science, rather, as an extension of the theory of aspect (which
could be generalised as philosophy in this context).
Let us remember that science embraces physics, which
ranges from macro phenomena like celestial movement and the structure of the
universe to micro phenomena such as the origin of material – molecules, atoms,
atomic nuclei, DNA – or physiology, which explores human organs such as the brain
and heart in relation to the movement of nerve cells. The development of
science has exerted great influence on the worldview of mankind from the 17th
century to this day, excluding philosophy and theology from these problems.
Under these circumstances, how did Hawtrey, who proposed a theory of aspect,
attempt to position science within his philosophy? – This is the problem we
address here.
Philosophers have sought an aspect of the universe
which will be plausible, which, that is, will be exposed to the least possible
degree of intrinsic doubtfulness, and will command the highest attainable
degree of credibility. At the outset
they are faced with the difficulty that what is known about the Universe is
very incomplete. In order to form an aspect of the whole, they must fill up the
gaps so far as they can. That is to say, they must construct a concept of the
entire realm of existence. In doing so, they are pursuing the method of
scientific discovery by framing hypotheses to account for experience, but they
are trespassing beyond the limits of science, because they are adopting
hypotheses which cannot be verified. In default of verification they have to
appeal to intrinsic probability. (pp.257-258)
In these conditions philosophers
considered the universe. Although a method of scientific discovery was applied,
scientists in the modern sense were yet to appear.
Here the “causal hypothesis” comes into play.
The causal hypothesis introduces into thought its own
characteristic form of inference. Cause implies effect. Empirical
reasoning seeks a concept with causal
properties, to explain some sequence in experience. The causal properties may
be nothing more than a crude rule to the effect that a certain type of event is
always followed by a certain other type of event. (p.169)
Causal hypotheses are used
both in the theory of aspect and the theory of science, having, respectively,
mind and matter as initial cause.
Mind and matter have been
posited by the causal hypothesis, each to be the vehicle of its own
characteristic causal activity: matter can serve as the vehicle of physical
movement, because it has spatial characteristics; mind can be the vehicle of
conscious experience. Each acts in its own special sphere. (p.253)
Matter is the hypothetical vehicle of causality, and
must in some way carry the spatial and temporal relations which are the subject
matter of physical causality. (p.263)
Here we need to turn our
attention to the theory of science. When a causal hypothesis is adopted in
science, it cannot determine the initial cause however far it might trace it back.
For the initial mover cannot, by nature, explained be by a causal hypothesis.
It is “matter” that is introduced as the driving force of a causal relation.
Scientific explanation depends on it.
However, Hawtrey argues that the concept of
“matter” used in science is far from complete. In the first place, even if a
“causal feature” and a “spatial feature” are made use of, the relation to
integrate the two is by no means clarified.
But when we ask what is in the concept of matter which
determines all the causal properties, there is no answer. Hume’s scepticism
holds the field. The concept of matter is incomplete, for the causal
properties are super-imposed on the spatial qualities without any specifiable
relation calculated to unify them. (p.260)
Scientists are satisfied nowadays with the acceptance
of their conclusions as a mere description of the orderliness of experience.
The reality of matter is not an alternative to this position, but is an
additional hypothesis, the plausibility of which depends on the degree of
credibility of the concept of matter itself. (p.259)
When we carry the assumptions of science into the
sphere of life and of mind, the incompleteness of the concept of matter becomes
more conspicuous. The discovery of formulas governing the behaviour of the
sub-atoms in living organisms is no more than an aspiration. If it is ever to
be fulfilled, we cannot foresee even in barest outline what the concept will be
like. (p.260)
Hawtrey’s view in these
spheres includes another important concept – “probability”. This embraces not
only calculable but also incalculable probability. Hawtrey argues, moreover,
that this is applicable not only to mental processes but also to the sphere of
the substance of matter.
Only exceptionally is the
probability of a particular empirical proposition susceptible of numerical
measurement. In other cases there is a direct judgement of a greater or smaller
degree of probability. There seems to be no reason why the same mental process
which leads to an estimate of probability in those cases should not apply to
the plausibility of a view of the universe, such as the reality of matter.
(p.259)
These observations show
strong affinity with Keynes’s concept of “probability”.
3.3 Criticism of Behaviorism
and Logical Positivism
Hawtrey pursued the
investigation into how scientific recognition could be bridged with the “theory
of aspect”. On the other hand, he made explicit criticism of the philosophy
which stresses the importance of science, emphasizing matter. He argued against
behaviorism, logical positivism, scientism, materialism (and historical
materialism). Here we will consider the first two objects of his criticism.
(a) Behaviorism
Of the stance taken in behaviorism
on the delicate relation between science and mind, Hawtrey is critical.
Behaviorism argues that the mental activity of human beings is closely related
to the nerves or some portion of brain, so that irrespective of, or independent
of, how one thinks, the mental activity of human beings should be explicable.
Not only does sense experience correspond to
the state of the physical senses,
but it is held that the mental processes of thought,
feeling and volition, which intervene in the making of decisions, also have
physical counterparts in the brain and nervous system, forming a self-contained
causal chain, the action of which is independent of the mind. The mind would be
no more than a passive record of the physical sequence, an epiphenomenon.
(p.226)
The postulate of behaviourism is a hypothesis which
would extend the mechanistic explanation to the facts of psychology and to our
apparently purposive action. .… The postulate therefore remains for its
adherents an act of faith. (p.227)
How should we understand the
relation between the mind’s conscious action and the functional activity of the
person’s brain and nerve system corresponding to it? Behaviorists as well as
materialists stress the above postulate (materialistic view), while Hawtrey
supports the “mind” view. As have seen, Hawtrey, moreover, aims to explore the
relation between mind and matter - thought and things.
The postulate of behaviourism denies the common sense
belief that the purposive behaviour of human bodies can only be interpreted as
presupposing conscious direction. …There is a fundamental difference between a
field of consciousness and a field of mechanistic causation. (p.241)
The question is whether there can be a perfect
correspondence between the field of consciousness, in which action is
determined by preference, and the field of mechanism, in which action is
determined by causal uniformity. (p.242)
Let us take up a simple case. Suppose someone is faced with a choice
between two flowers – rose and amaryllis. The person chooses amaryllis, for he
knows that the host in the family who invited him is very fond of amaryllis,
though he himself loves roses. How could a behaviorist explain this phenomenon
in terms of the activity of a brain and nervous system? This must be impossible
to explain even if science makes miraculous progress. The above case of the rose
and amaryllis is a problem which an analysis based on the activity of brain
cells and the nervous system cannot tackle.
I believe the theory of
aspects has a bearing on this question [whether or not physiology will come to
be able to explain behavior in a self-contained way independently of the mental
processes], in that the discernment of aspects is an essentially mental
process, which cannot have an adequate physical counterpart. (p. 227. The
square brackets are mine.)
Conscious direction by human beings has the maximum
degree of intrinsic probability.（p.263）
By contrast, Hawtrey makes to
some extent a positive assessment of Gestalt psychology, stating that it shares
some elements in common with the theory of aspect.
Thus the Gestalt Psychologists may be regarded as
introducing aspects into
psychology. (p.245)
Hawtrey, however, comments that, alas, the Gestalt psychologists express
support of the behaviorists’ view of the relation between mind and matter.
(b) Logical Positivism
Hawtrey is also critical of
logical positivism, which excludes metaphysics from its field of study on the
ground that it is not verifiable, arguing that it lacks the point of view of
perception in the field of consciousness.
Logical positivism regards verification as essential
to the meaning of a proposition. Hawtrey takes A.J. Ayer, a representative of
this school, as object of his criticism.
His [Ayer’s] twofold division of knowledge into
empirical judgements, which are subject to verification, and analytic judgements,
which are tautologous, supports the extreme empiricism of logical positivism.
(p.181)
Professor
Ayer in his contribution to The
Revolution in Philosophy (p.74) explains that “statements like those of
metaphysics, to the truth of which no empirical observation could possibly be
relevant, are ruled out as factually meaningless. The emphasis here is on the
word ‘factually’ – not capable of stating facts”. (p.182)
However, he argues that
aspects which exist in the state of consciousness, which is the theater of the theory
of aspect, are indeed essential to our recognition, and yet not of a nature
which requires verification.
But it is not only aspects of
sense experience that provide a kind of knowing which does not need
verification. Aspects of states of consciousness other than sense experience
are of the same kind. (p.182a)
The contention of logical positivism that
verifiability is essential to truth is untenable. (p.182b)
Hawtrey is highly critical
of Ayer’s explanation of Kant’s analytical judgment and synthetic judgment from
the point of view of the theory of aspect. Above all, the following observation
regarding mathematics is worth noting. As shown in Fig.1, “The Whole Field of
Consciousness”, mathematical propositions and mathematical inference are
included in “the states induced within mind”.
Professor Ayer criticised Kant’s argument for
the synthetic nature of mathematics on the ground that the question was not a
psychological one but a logical one. But knowledge is psychological. To
treat the matter as purely logical meant ignoring the limitations to which the
human mind’s knowledge is subject. (p.179)
Hawtrey argues that
mathematics is not purely logical, but is subject to the limitations of the mind’s
knowledge.
Recognition of a kind of knowing of physical objects
which claims the same kind of directness as the propositions of mathematics,
conflicts with this division [empirical judgment and analytical judgment]. (pp.
181-182)
In fact, logical positivism
as composed of empirical judgment which requires verification and analytical
judgment which is tautology (mathematics belongs to this category) embodies
self-contradiction as philosophy of science, for the reason why mathematics is
required together with empirical judgment is not clarified at all.
Moreover, Hawtrey argues the difference
between “empirical reasoning” (it should be noted that this is reasoning in the
theory of aspect, different from empirical judgment in logical positivism) and
mathematical reasoning.
It is in his argument of
probability that Hawtrey’s point of argument becomes clearer.
Probability, like size or distance, is an aspect to be
discerned; it is an aspect of the thought which asserts a proposition. (p.158)
“An aspect of the thought …
proposition” might basically rest on the same idea as the concept of
probability in Keynes’s Treatise on
Probability and Russell’s subsequent considerations.
Thus a judgement of probability
applied to a philosophical interpretation of the universe comes under the head
of Lord Russell’s “intrinsic doubtfulness”, or “degree of credibility”. (p.257)
To recapitulate, Hawtrey
thinks that “mathematical proposition, mathematical reasoning, probability”
belong to “the states induced within mind”, and is critical of logical
positivism, which neglects the mind and argues that science can make progress
by excluding ideas related to the mind as “metaphysical”. First, it is a
misconception of mathematics and probability. Secondly, it is a misconception
of science (though science per se remains important).
4. Philosophical Currents in Cambridge
Hawtrey was an ardent
supporter of G.E. Moore’s philosophy, and its influence continued throughout
his life. Moreover, he was an apostle, and deeply involved in in the Cambridge
current of philosophy. In Thought and
Things, naturally enough, he referred to Cambridge philosophers such as
Moore, Russell, Keynes, Wittgenstein, Ramsey and so forth in various pages9
(although on the whole there are few if any points in which he shows a critical
attitude towards them – despite the differences between his view and theirs).
To my knowledge, there is no material in the
book indicating what sort of discussion was held among them. That said, in this
section, let us make a brief survey of the currents of Cambridge philosophy,
taking Hawtrey’s philosophy into consideration.
4.1 G.E. Moore
It is well-known that Moore
came to lead Cambridge philosophy in a new direction, criticizing MacTaggart,
who represented Hegelian Idealism in the UK. Influenced by Moore, Russell
stated that he, too, had decided to depart from that line.
That said, Moore was not an empiricist, and
was very critical of pragmatism, as can be seen in his criticism of James’
rationalism.
With regard to the
controversy between scientism and the Neo-Kantian School which advocated
“Return to Kant” as a motto and could be characterised as transcendental, Moore was sympathetic with
the latter.
Moore’s s way of thinking has a certain
affinity with that of Socrates and Plato. The approach, asking “what is
Goodness” and pursuing it, is strongly reminiscent of Socrates. And yet, he
does not move forward to a theory of ideas. Rather, he conceives of “Goodness”
in a presentative way, arguing that it is impossible to define. Moreover, he
criticizes, a number of philosophical approaches, including utilitarianism,
from the point of view of intuitionism, stating that they are subject to the “naturalistic
fallacy”. The idea of “sense data”, which influenced Russell among others, is
also important for a knowledge of Moore’s philosophy.
The ideas Moore proposed exerted a great
influence on Keynes and his contemporaries including Hawtrey, Lytton Strachey,
Shove and Leonard Woolf. They are, on the whole, critical of utilitarianism
(Here Keynes’s view on Edgeworth (1926) is worth noting).
As is clear from his way of argument, Moore
was inclined to take language very seriously. Thus he came to address the
problem of language, and pay increasing attention to “ordinary language” and
“common sense” in his philosophy.
Attention to “ordinary language” was the
stance adopted by the latter-day Wittgenstein - although he endorsed this
element even in the Tractus Logico-Philosophicus. Moore regularly
attended the lectures (1930-33) by Wittgenstein, who had returned to Cambridge,
to the extent that he eventually published his notes on them.
It should be added that Hawtrey and Keynes seem not to have shared an interest
in “ordinary language”.
4.2 Russell
Russell’s philosophy is known as “logical atomism”,
and is characterized thus:
The reason that I call my
doctrine logical atomism is because the atoms that I wish to arrive at as the sort of
last residue in analysis are logical atoms and not physical atoms. Some of them
will be what I call ‘particulars’ – such things as little patches of colour or
sounds, momentary things – and some of them will be predicates or relations and
so on. The point is that the atom I wish to arrive at is the atom of logical
analysis, not the atom of physical analysis. (Russell, 1985 [1918], p.37)
Russell and Whitehead tried
to reduce mathematics to logic in the Principia
Mathematica. Logical atomism makes a similar endeavor in the
field of philosophy.
Russell’s philosophy, like Wittgenstein’s, became the
bible of the “Vienna Circle” which advocated Logical Positivism (this was
against the Neo-Kantian School, and adopted a motto, “purge metaphysics from
science”).
Logical
atomism was to exert a deep influence on Keynes’s Treatise on
Probability. However, on the whole, more scholars seem to have taken a critical
attitude towards it in Cambridge. Wittgenstein showed
some discordance from the
outset, and finally came to a clean break. Keynes also
seems to have become
critical of logical atomism later. Ramsey was also
critical. He moved in the
direction of Pragmatism. Hawtrey’s philosophy, Things
and Thought, took a huge
distance from logical atomism, although no critical
comments are to be found
there.
There is a
clear difference between Moore’s philosophy and Russell’s. The
contrasting relation can be summed up as ordinary
language vs. ideal
language; or intuitionism vs. formal logic/logical atomism.
4.3 Keynes
Greatly influenced by Moore
and Russell, Keynes wrote a dissertation for his King’s College fellowship -
the prototype of what was to be published later as A Treatise on Probability.
The book makes two major departures. 10
The first departure consists in an inquiry
into epistemology and logic in a world in which “probability” defined as “a
degree of rational belief between propositions” was predominant. He stressed
the “objective” logical relation between a premise and a proposition. By
applying this relation to the field of “probability”, Keynes aimed at building
the philosophical foundations for logical judgment based on human reason.
“Indirect knowledge”, dealt with in A
Treatise on Probability, is obtained through argument. When an argument is
composed of a complicated set of sub-arguments, a knowledge of formal logic is
indispensable. Thus recognition by rational human beings in the form of an
axiomatic theoretical system is required. This is the main aim addressed in
Book II.
Another departure is his justification of “Induction”.
The theory of probability developed in Books I and II is directly connected to
Book III, “Induction and Analogy”, in which Keynes argues that “induction is a
problem of formal logic (the existence of the relation of probability) rather
than a problem of facts”.
According to him, induction is composed of
“analogy” and “pure induction” (the latter refers to simple repetition of
cases). Of the two, it is analogy which matters. He argues that a priori probability
is obtained by analogy.
When knowledge is imperfect, analogy proceeds to the
higher stages with the aid of pure induction. He went on to argue that
induction can be justified, insofar as the number of “features of a thing”
(such as “it has four legs”, “it has hair”) is limited either by “the method of
perfect analogy” (which is due to an individual introspection) or by “other
inductive method” (the method, by finding negative analogy with the aid of pure
induction, of approaching perfect analogy).
Keynes did not write any article or book on philosophy
thereafter, so we cannot know exactly whether he continued his early philosophy
or not, except for a few short essays. That said, I am inclined to take the
view that he changed his philosophy later for the following reasons.
Among other things, what mattered was the relation
with Ramsey. It is well known that Ramsey favored pragmatism11,
unlike Moore and Keynes, and put forward a theory of subjective probability,
which differed from Keynes’s theory of objective probability.
Meanwhile, Ramsey leveled some harsh criticism at Keynes’s
Treatise on Probability, a great deal of which Keynes (1931) accepted.
Keynes expressed his view that formal the logic
of Russell and (the early-day) Wittgenstein proceeded in such a way as to be void
of content, becoming “dry bones”, and ultimately excluding not only all
experience but also almost all principles of rational thinking.
Ramsey, by contrast, proposed a kind of
pragmatism which addresses human logic, criticizing Wittgenstein (it is well
known that serious discussion with Ramsey, and indeed with Sraffa,12
made a great contribution to the emergence of the latter-day Wittgenstein).
Ramsey distinguished human logic from formal
logic. Man has a useful mental habit of dealing with things provided by sense
and memory, and so has a consistent system by applying this to a logic of
probability. Although calculation of probability belongs to formal logic, a
degree of our belief should be like a part of clothes, and should be close to
our sense or memory rather than to formal logic. Thus Keynes largely came round
to accepting Ramsey’s view.
This is not to say, however, that Keynes was converted
to Ramsey’s philosophy, for the latter-day Keynes did not accept series of
subjective probability or pragmatism. What Keynes emphasized in “My Early
Beliefs” (Keynes, 1939) is that he himself gradually departed from rationalism,
and came to emphasize the importance of the ambiguity of the real world, and
with it, therefore, custom and so forth13.
As we have seen, Hawtrey expressed a
sympathetic view of probability as expressed in Keynes’s Treatise on
Probability14. He saw it, in terms of aspects, as one of the
states induced within the mind.
Since no belief can be absolutely certain, every
thought embodying a belief may be said to present this aspect (probability),
but in general the aspect remains a mere potentiality and is not noticed. Only
when the process by which a judgement has been arrived at is felt to be in some
way insufficiently cogent to form a basis for action, is attention turned to
its doubtfulness and it enters the stock of knowledge labelled “probable”.
(p.161)
It should be added that
there is no evidence left as to how Keynes judged Hawtrey’s theory of aspect.
4.4 Wittgenstein
Around 1930, Wittgenstein
began to doubt the “theory of logical determination” (Takiura, 1983, p.159)
which is the principal framework of Tractus Logico-Philosophicus
(written in 1918, and published in 1922), and through trial and error
thereafter wrote the substance of Part 1 of Philosophical Investigations
at the end of 1936 (the final version in 1949. This seems to be the beginning
of the latter-day Wittgenstein who put forward the “language game” theory.
Tractus Logico-Philosophicus is said
to have made a great contribution to the emergence of logical positivism
together with The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (Russell, 1918).
Especially in the development of the latter, Russell stated that he was greatly
influenced by Wittgenstein, the author of the former, so it was understood that
the two scholars were working in the same direction.
Even in this period, in fact, there was a great difference
between the two. Wittegenstein was very critical of Russell’s philosophy.
Moreover, as we saw above, Russell continued to stick to, and develop “a theory
of logical atomism”, shifting from “an empirical approach” to “a rationalist
approach”. See Pears). In the same period, Wittgenstein was to be deeply
engaged in “language game” theory, so relations between the two went from
tension to final rupture.
4.5 Theory of Aspect in
Hawtrey and Wittgenstein
Let us now consider the
difference between the two in theory of aspect. In the case of Hawtrey,
“aspect” is intersubjective (semi-objective). There exist aspects (in this
sense they are close to Platonic idea). He argues that each mind can grasp
them. He tries to grasp things in such a way as many kinds of aspects are
attached to them. Important concepts are then developed from them.
What needs to be emphasized here is that
Hawtrey’s theory of aspects can be traced back to Hawtrey (1912). It was read
at the ‘Friday Club’ meeting of artists.
Though he argued out his theory
of aspect, confining it to art – painting, music and so forth – we can see
sufficient continuity to Thought and Things. One passage in particular is
worth quoting.
If you have grasped what I mean by an aspect you will
see of what vital importance it is to our minds. Both memory and imagination,
so far as they relate to the objects of sense, deal primarily in aspects.
Detail is filled in mainly by reason. (p.3)
On the other hand, in the case of Wittgenstein15, aspect,
which is discussed in Part 2, Chapter 11 in Philosophical Investigations
[Part 2 was completed in 1949], is regarded as a kind of image grasped by the mind.
And it is perceived as a different image by each mind (see Jastrow’s famous
“Duck-Rabbit Picture”). It is very subjective, so it does not exist objectively
16.
Let us now go on to consider some of the similarities seen
in the two
philosophies. Firstly, both show some closeness to Köhler’s Gestalt psychology
(cf.TT, 234, 244), and share psychological cogitations in
common. Secondly, both
are critical of scientism and logical positivism.
Thirdly, both are critical of
Russell’s logical atomism.
Speaking of
points of difference, the “language game ideas” adopted by
Wittgenstein are not recognizable in Hawtrey. In general,
Wittgenstein attaches
weight to language, ordinary language, while Hawtery does not.
4.6 Hawtrey’s Philosophy
Re-stated
Hawtrey took the perception
of the field of consciousness through sense experience as the foundation of
philosophy. In that sense his philosophy differs from the Platonic theory of
ideas. We cannot prove the existence of things. We can grasp aspects
consciously through sense experience, and have a capacity of recognition only
through building them within the mind.
On the other hand, Hawtrey criticizes logical
positivism, which argues that because metaphysics cannot be empirical, science
should expel it from the object of research.
He argues that it is a lacking in the view of perception of the field of
consciousness.
Finally, I would point out the two passages
useful in understanding Hawtrey’s philosophical stance.
The reality of sense experience is the indispensable
premise of any form of empiricism. (p.182)
Value judgements are among those metaphysical
statements “to the truth of which no empirical observation could possibly be
relevant”. (p.182b)
We have outlined the
philosophical currents in Cambridge, which suffice to evidence its importance
as a center in the world. It was under these circumstances that Hawtrey made
his own philosophical explorations. Let me repeat, unhappily, we cannot find
any document showing what kind of philosophical controversy Hawtrey engaged in with
these philosophers under these circumstances.
5. Conclusion
We have examined Hawtrey’s
unpublished book, Thought and Things. The main theory there seems to be
the theory of aspect. It focuses on the mind’s selection which appears in the
field of consciousness, from which it tries to explain the various mental
products such as concept, knowledge and so forth. Hawtrey conceives of “an
aspect” as intersubjective, or even extending to a more objective level.
Then, as the title, “Thought and Things”
shows, Hawtrey tackles the thorny old problem of how the relation between “mind
and matter” or “theory of aspect and science” should be understood. We might
say that the final aim of this unpublished book was to explore how one can
build a bridge between the two, without falling into dualism. Though he did not
reach the final answer, he developed his argument compellingly, aiming at
building a bridge.
Hawtrey was severely critical of behaviorism
and logical positivism, which looked at
the world from a scientific point of view neglecting the mind. These criticisms
are worth attention, for they argue that behaviorism and logical positivism are
based on a misunderstanding of science and mathematics. Hawtrey points out the
following – Concerning science, a causal hypothesis introduces “matter” as its
prime mover without arguing a relation between “a causal property” and “spatial
property”, so that the concept of matter is incomplete. Moreover, when it comes
to the field of life and mind, the incompleteness of the concept of matter is
much more conspicuous.
As for mathematical considerations, when we remember that
Hawtrey argues “mathematical proposition” and “probability” in terms of “theory
of aspect”, the distance from the approach of logical positivism is strikingly evident
(See Fig. 1).
1) Hirai (2007)
examines this.
2) Hirai (2009)
and Hirai (2012) examine this.
3) In Google Scholar and EBSCO the author was able to find neither
papers discussing Hawtrey’s philosophy nor documents concerning Thought and
Things.
4) In the philosophical world, “the theory of aspect” is used for the
argument in Part II of Philosophical Investigations by Wittgenstein
(see, e.g. Shoroeder [2010], Arahata [2013]).
There is no place for Hawtrey. For the relation between the two, see Section 4.
5) The theory of aspect examined so far is similar to Husserl’s
phenomenology as a study of “conscious experience as experienced from a point
of subjective view” (“intentionality, that is, directness of experience towards
things in the world”. In that this experience includes “sense, thought, memory,
imagination, feeling, volition, will”, there is a similarity.
However, in Thought and Things, there is no reference to
phenomenology. That said, this idea emerges in phenomenology, deeply influenced
by Kant. And evidently, Hawtrey himself was directly influenced by Kant. His
answer to Hume was that the orderliness of sense experience dwells not in
things in themselves but in the constitution of the observing mind. “Form is
not to be looked for in the object in itself, but in the subject [the field of
consciousness] to which the object appears”. (p.288. [ ] is the author’s)
6) Armstrong (1968) is mentioned. See T&T,
pp.253b-253c, p.310.
7) See the theory of sense-data developed in Russell (1912). There it is
argued as a relation between “appearance” and “reality”.
8) “Familiarity” by Hawtrey is analogous to
“Acquaintance” by Russell.
9) For frequent references, the following are
mentioned: Russell (pp.13, 18,20,28,43, 132a, 132b,
139,140,159,160,161,165,166, 166a, 184, 185, 186,189, 195, 197, 198, 204,
209,257, 285, 286), Moore (pp.6-7, 96,100-102,130,131,132,132a,132b,182b),
Keynes (156,157, 158,159, 160, 161).
10) See Hirai
(2002).
11) There is no reference to pragmatism in Thought
and Things.
12) See Kurz (2009).
13) Itoh（1999, p.58）argues thus: Accepting Ramsey’s criticism, Keynes came
to
relinquish “a logicism interpretation of probability” in A Treatise
on
Probability and sought the
“connection between uncertainty and rationality”
in “the world of transcendent propositions”, which is evident in The
General
Theory.
14) In
“Probability” (pp.155a-161) in Thought and Things, three main themes
in Keynes’s Treatise
on Probability – probability in the field of
immeasurability,
the definition of probability, and “induction and analogy” –
are examined. Among other things, the second and the
third points are
examined, taking Russell’s argument in Human
Knowledge (esp. “intrinsic
doubtfulness”) into consideration.
15) There are
two kinds of aspects in Wittgenstein – “aspect
of changes” and
“continuous
aspects”. Though there is a divergence of view as to which Wittgenstein
attached more weight to, the latter appears to be closer to Hawtrey’s aspects.
16) On aspects, there are references to Philosophical Investigations
(Wittgenstein, 1963) in Thought and
Things (pp.11, 12,109, 110,131). However, Hawtrey has nothing to say about the
difference between the two. Incidentally, reference to “theory of language
game” is found on p. 194, while reference to the Tractus Logico-Philosophicus
(Wittgenstein, 1922) is found on pp.163, 164, 165.
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