国際秩序の変貌 ー 錨なき漂流
いま起きているシリア危機は一周辺国の問題に終わらない様相をみせている。イニシアチブをプーチンが握っている。1991年のソ連崩壊以降、ソ連側、というかロシアが国際政治・軍事の領域で主導権を握ったのは初めてのことである。2000年までロシアはヨレヨレの出来損ないの資本主義システムをもっていた。プーチンはブッシュのアフガン攻撃にも最初に賛成していた。ロシア経済が立ち直りをみせ、2期目のプーチンが行っていたことは、天然ガスパイプラインのバルブを締めるようなことぐらいであった。
他方、アメリカは90年以降、世界唯一の覇権国家となった。戦う相手は国家というよりもアルカイダであった。アフガン、イラク戦争をアメリカはしかけたが、その成果はどうみても勝利ではない。そしてアメリカはいまそれらの地から撤退しようとしている。これは軍事的にみれば敗退・後退であり、その空白はだれかが埋めることになるのである。
気がついてみれば、アメリカは唯一の覇権国家ではなくなっている。そしてロシアがおり、中国が控えている（中国はアジアで軍事的圧力を強めている。アメリカの状況をみながら、である）。
化学兵器がシリアには大量にあり、しかもそこを援助しているのはロシアであることは誰の目にも明らかである。が、アメリカはシリア空爆をすることができない。ロシアは報復手段に出ると明言しているからである。そしてオバマは、ロシアの突然の提案に乗り、議会は空爆支持の決議を延長してほしいという異例の訴えをしている。
いまのアメリカにシリアに攻撃をしかける力はない。すれば戦線の拡大はコントロールを容易に超えてしまうからである。おまけにアメリカは予算統制法によりシークエスタを実行していかねばならず、その予算削減の重要な対象は軍事費なのである。
アメリカは力を喪失しており、EUには統一した政策などない。国連では何も決めることができない。こうして世界秩序は錨なき漂流を始めている。
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International order: drifting without an anchor
Democracy promotion and state-building are debased currencies. So what design should<b international policymakers pursue?
o Editorial
o The Guardian, Thursday 12 September 2013 21.24 BST
There were many ironies to the lecture that Vladimir Putin gave New York Times readers on the need to uphold international law. Here was an assiduous supplier of Bashar al-Assad's war machine – just as effective a feeder of the collective furnace as Iran, Hezbollah, Libyan middle men, Saudi Arabia and Qatar – posing as peacebroker. But here too was the man who, only two weeks ago, was deemed so peripheral to US foreign policy goals that Barack Obama cancelled plans to hold a bilateral with him at St Petersburg. Russia's temporary emergence as the knight in shining armour holds one unsavoury truth to those in the White House, Downing Street and the Elysée who still believe in business as usual on the world stage: the failure of western diplomacy has handed the initiative to Russia. This is because, for such a long time, the aim of British, French and US foreign policy was not to seek a diplomatic solution to Syria, but to support the rebels in securing a military one.
It is difficult to resist the notion, however, that something more fundamental is taking place: that Syria, after the failures of interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, may not be sui generis. The twists and turns of policy raging in Mr Obama's own mind about a strike on Syria are the latest example of what the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) has dubbed the year of living tactically. The IISS defines the problem as more than a failure of leadership or will. It is the absence of strategy that worries it most. Crisis management has replaced the pursuit of grand designs. It puts much of the blame on Washington itself, which it says acts not just out of war-weariness, but from a judgment that most foreign-policy problems fall into the "too hard" category. Why stop there?
An example of British hubris was on display at an arms fair in Docklands this week when the first sea lord, Admiral Sir George Zambellas, claimed that two large new aircraft carriers being built for the navy would put Britain back on the world stage. The carriers would be nothing less than a symbol of national authority, he claimed. Putting to one side the difficulty he will have in finding planes to put on them, the words themselves hark back to a sepia-tinted vision of British naval power. They are perilously at odds with a world where the utility of force is not obvious. Does Britain conceive its role to be that of an international firefighter? In which case, it has engaged in interventions that have spread fires more than they have extinguished them. Is Britain an essential member of future military coalitions?
The two closest coalitions are in need of some repair in the dry dock. Nato's past purpose was clear, but its future one, after Afghanistan, is anything but. And the EU did not act in Mali – France did. Germany ducked Libya and resisted a strong statement at the G20 on Syria. François Hollande is drawing the wrong conclusions if he thinks Mali will form a reliable template for Syria. An alliance forged by a common will? It can work in specific areas, such as the anti-piracy campaign off the coast of Somalia. But where it matters most, on its doorstep in the Mediterranean, and in the Middle East, EU foreign policy is held together with duct tape.
What grand design should international policymakers be pursuing? Democracy promotion and state-building are debased currencies, after the experience of Afghanistan and Iraq. Responsibility to protect is following a similar trajectory in Syria. But the first-order question still remains unanswered. If indeed we are bidding farewell to a world where the only global policeman is no longer up to walking the beat, to whom does the task now fall? International law and order, and interventions, derive first and foremost from establishing their legitimacy and from answering the question: whose law and whose order? To do that we need a UN security council that represents the nations that do the bulk of international peacekeeping. We are entering an era where the big global players of the 20th century no longer have that power on their own.
